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ABSTRACT: Whether we perceive high-level properties is presently a source of  controversy. A 
promising test case for whether we do is aesthetic perception. Aesthetic properties are distinct from 
low-level properties, like shape and colour. Moreover, some of  them, e.g. being serene and being hand-
some, are properties we appear to perceive. Aesthetic perception also shares a similarity with gestalt 
effects, e.g. seeing-as, in that aesthetic properties, like gestalt phenomena, appear to ‘emerge’ from 
low-level properties. Gestalts effects, of  course, are widely observed, which raises the question: do 
gestalt effects make it plausible that we (sometimes) perceive high-level aesthetic properties? Contra 
Stokes (forthcoming), this paper argues that they don’t. This is interesting in its own right, but it 
also points to a more general lesson, namely we should resist the temptation to appeal to gestalt 
effects to argue for high-level perception.  
KEYWORDS: High-Level Properties; Aesthetic properties; Rich Content; Liberal Content; Gestalt 
Psychology; Seeing-as 
Whether we perceptually experience high-level properties is presently a source of  controversy. A good, 
though neglected, test case for whether we do is aesthetic perception. Both common sense and domi-
nant traditions in art criticism appear to treat aesthetic properties as perceptible. Moreover, these tend 
to pass as high-level properties on major ways of  drawing the high-level vs. low-level distinction. For 
instance, they are properties which we can be aware of  only via the neural processing of  low-level 
properties (Lyons 2005). The ethereal quality of  a Casorati painting, say, cannot be perceived without 
processing its shapes and colours.  
 It appears, then, that there are prima facie reasons for taking seriously the thesis we perceive 
high-level aesthetic properties. If  this thesis actually turns out true, it would not only be a significant 
result, but a cause for surprise for many philosophers of  mind sceptical of  high-level perception. 
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Stokes (forthcoming) argues it is true, and does so by appealing to the occurrence of  gestalt effects, e.g. 
seeing-as.  Gestalt effects are often employed in discussions of  aesthetic experience, e.g. Sibley (1959), 
Walton (1970) and Arnheim (1974). They are also sometimes alluded to in discussions of  high-level 
perception, e.g. Block (2014) and Helton (2016). However, aside from Stokes, there is a conspicuous 
absence of  any discussion of  the idea that lessons for high-level perception might be drawn from the 
analogy between perceiving aesthetic properties and gestalt effects. Stokes’s paper is significant precisely 
because it offers the only articulation of  this idea to date.  
 The present paper aims to explore this idea further, and does so by raising scepticism about 
Stokes’s proposal. In what follows, I outline Stokes’s argument (§I), highlight an important distinction 
between types of  gestalt effects (§II), and draw on this distinction to explain why the argument doesn't 
work (§III). I conclude by drawing the opposite lesson to the one presently available: gestalt effects do 
not make it plausible that we perceive high-level aesthetic properties. 
I.    The Argument from Seeing-As 
Stokes defends the thesis that we (sometimes) perceive high-level aesthetic properties by appealing to 
the following argument:  
1. Seeing-as, e.g. seeing an image as a duck vs. seeing it as a rabbit, involves the representation of  
high-level properties. 
2. Plausibly, the two overall experiences involved in seeing-as, e.g. seeing an image as a duck vs. seeing 
it as a rabbit, differ in phenomenology. 
3. The most natural explanation for (2) is that seeing-as involves a difference in visual representation. 
4. Therefore, seeing-as involves the visual representation of  high-level properties. 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
5. Aesthetic properties, like being serene and being impressionist, are high-level properties. 
6. Perceiving such aesthetic properties involves the same kind of  perceptual gestalts as seeing-as. 
7. Therefore, perceiving such aesthetic properties involves the visual representation of  high-level 
properties. 
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The argument is an inference to the best explanation, and attempts to make plausible the conclusion, 
“aesthetic reaction sometimes involves perceptual representation of  high-level properties” (pg. 14-5). 
One may take issue with any number of  its premises, but the point of  interest for us is the part of  the 
argument which exploits the similarity between gestalt effects and our aesthetic reactions. In other 
words, what concerns us is premise (6). As we shall see, this premise, as well as (1) and (4), are called 
into question on account of  different ways of  understanding gestalt phenomena. 
II.    Types of  Gestalt Effects 
Stokes’s exposition of  gestalt effects relies on the notion of  seeing-as, which he takes to be exemplified 
by our experiences of the duck-rabbit (figure. 1) and the Rubin goblet (figure. 2). These examples are 
misleading. Nevertheless, explaining why they are so helps identify the precise way in which our aesthet-
ic reactions are supposed to involve the same kind of  perceptual gestalts as those involved in seeing-as. 
 The examples are misleading for the following reason. The phenomenon of  seeing-as, exempli-
fied by these examples, is a gestalt shift. All gestalt shifts are gestalt effects, but not all gestalt effects are 
gestalt shifts. The problem is gestalt shifts count as gestalt effects in two ways, which in turn obscures 
the precise feature they have in common with aesthetic reaction. (What such reaction has in common 
with gestalt effects, I shall argue, is a feature that is not particular to gestalt shifts). 
 Some background helps bring this out. The term ‘gestalt’ literally means shape or form, while 
Gestalt psychology is a theory premised on the primacy of  perceiving the whole over its parts. As von 
der Heydt et al. observe, “structured wholes or Gestalten, rather than sensations, are the primary units 
of  mental life. This was the key idea of  the new and revolutionary Gestalt theory, developed by Wer-
theimer and his colleagues in Berlin” (2012: 1173). This idea is often spelt out by explaining how cer-
tain demonstrable visual effects conform to gestalt principles to do with perceptual grouping and fig-
ure-ground organisation.  
 Stokes’s argument does not rely on Gestalt psychology being true, but simply the occurrence of  
certain gestalt effects. The theory, nonetheless, helps inform what counts as a gestalt effect. Such an 
effect is an effect that conforms to one or more gestalt principles; principles concerning figure-ground 
organisation and perceptual grouping. Gestalt shifts, as exemplified by our experiences of  the duck-
  !3
rabbit and the Rubin goblet, conform to two such principles. The obvious one is ‘multistability’. This 
principle concerns how ambiguous figures, i.e. figures that can be seen as more than one image, cannot 
be viewed simultaneously, but rather shift back and forth between the various images.  
 This holds true for our experiences of  the duck-rabbit and the Rubin goblet, as well as our ex-
periences of  simpler images, like the Necker cube (figure 3.). In the latter case, we see the image of  a 
cube either as one where the bottom left square appears in the foreground while the top right one ap-
pears in the background, or vice versa. We cannot, however, see the image as one where both the bot-
tom left and top right squares appear in the foreground; nor as one where both appear in the back-
ground. The image shifts back and forth between either square being in the foreground or the back-
ground. This is why effects such as these are described as gestalt shifts. 
 These examples also conform to another principle, viz. ‘emergence’. According to this principle, 
we often see images primarily as a whole, as opposed to constructing them out of  parts which we have 
to see first. For instance, in the duck-rabbit case, we see either an image of  a duck or of  a rabbit, but 
crucially, for whichever image we see, we appear to see it as a whole. That is, in contrast to first seeing 
the individual colours and shapes that compose the image, and then piecing together the image from 
such experiences. This principle goes to the very heart of  gestalt psychology. But what’s more, this 
principle is satisfied by visual effects that don’t involve gestalt shifts. In other words, visual effects can 
conform to this principle without also conforming to the principle of  multistability. 
 Consider the zebra image (figure. 4) by way of  demonstration. When perceiving the image, we 
do not first see its parts, i.e. the various vertical and horizontal black lines, individually and then infer 
the whole, i.e. the zebra-shape, from these parts. Rather, the zebra-shape appears all at once. Our expe-
rience of  the image, then, conforms to the principle of  emergence. Nevertheless, it does so without 
conforming to the principle of  multistability, as the figure is not ambiguous between two or more im-
ages. 
 This distinction between types of  gestalt effects — based on the particular gestalt principles to 
which they conform — proves significant for how we are to understand (6). The premise states per-
ceiving aesthetic properties, e.g. being serene and being impressionist, involves the same kind of  perceptual 
gestalts as seeing-as. We now see that this could mean aesthetic perception conforms to the principe of  
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emergence, the principle of  multistability or both. An examination of  aesthetic experience, neverthe-
less, reveals the relevant principle to be emergence. 
 In his exposition of  (6), Stokes claims it is “natural” to describe a case where a child acquires 
the capacity to reliably attribute ‘impressionist’ to paintings “in terms of  a gestalt, even if  that gestalt 
cannot be defined in rigorous terms” (pg. 6). Though a child’s visual experiences of  paintings before 
and after she learns how to discriminate impressionist paintings can (figuratively) be said to undergo a 
gestalt shift, her experience of  any given painting doesn’t have the feature of  multistability. Looking at a 
Monet doesn't involve our experiences switching back and forth between two ambiguous figures, one 
that has the property being impressionist, the other which doesn’t; or likewise, one that has the property 
being serene, the other which doesn’t. 
 A charitable reading has it that the gestalt feature in common between seeing the duck-rabbit 
and seeing a Monet as impressionist is not multistability but something else. The following passage 
lends a clue:  
What [sensory perception] can represent, and more or less accurately, is the way basic features of  an object 
are organized. This is the phenomenal character that pops out when one shifts from seeing-as a duck to see-
ing-as a rabbit, and perhaps it is what pops out when one learns to recognize pine trees. (pg. 27)  1
This suggests a child’s visual experience of  a painting when she acquires the capacity to reliably attrib-
ute ‘impressionist’ to paintings has the following characteristic: the way basic features of  the painting 
are organised ‘pop out’ at her. The principle of  gestalt theory most suitable to describe this effect is 
emergence. When she sees the painting, she does not piece together the organised whole from its basic 
features; rather, she perceives the whole all at once.  
 Plausibly, a gestalt effect, then, still occurs, even though it isn't literally a gestalt shift. Moreover, 
it does so precisely because there is a feature, viz. emergence, which this and other aesthetic reactions 
have  in common with instances of  seeing-as. This point is significant, as we now see the suitability of  
 The mention of  recognising pine trees is a reference to Siegel (2006), who argues that a difference in visual ex1 -
perience is brought about when one learns how to discriminate pine trees.
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comparing aesthetic reactions with gestalt effects (by way of  arguing for high-level aesthetic perception) 
rests on both exhibiting the feature of  emergence.  
III.    Why the Argument Doesn’t Work 
Stokes’s argument appeals to a similarity between gestalt effects and aesthetic reaction to argue we can 
perceive high-level aesthetic properties. We now see the relevant similarity to be emergence. This focus 
on emergence helps us identify two distinct ways of  disambiguating the phenomenon of  seeing-as, 
both of  which ultimately render the argument implausible. The difference has to do with what is sup-
posed to emerge as the relevant gestalten. On a modest reading, the gestalten which emerge or 'pop 
out' are certain organised shape properties. For example, in the duck-rabbit case, what emerge are the 
shape-properties being organised like a duck and being organised like a rabbit. By contrast, on an immodest 
reading, what emerge are something above and beyond organised shape properties. They might be arti-
ficial kind properties, e.g. being a duck image and being a rabbit image, or being a duck representation and being a 
rabbit representation.  
 To be clear, the above distinction rests not on the shifting nature of  the gestalten, but the kinds 
of  gestalten at issue. On the modest interpretation, the gestalten are organised shapes, whereas in the 
immodest case, they are something else. How to articulate what emerges in this case is hard to say. This, 
in part, is due to the difference between the two interpretations being typically obscured in discussions 
of  seeing-as, especially those which employ the duck-rabbit image as an example. The difference can be 
brought out by comparing this to the Necker cube. In the latter case, what emerges are just the organ-
ised shape properties. We see the image as one of  a cube, in particular a cube that oscillates between 
one where either the left or right square is in the foreground. Crucially, the gestalten that appear are 
only organised shape properties. By comparison, in the duck-rabbit case, while the two gestalten that 
emerge in the first instance are organised shape properties, i.e. being organised like a duck and being organ-
ised like a rabbit, it also arguably involves two further gestalten, e.g. being a duck representation and being a 
rabbit representation. 
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 A way to illustrate this is to claim seeing organised shape properties doesn't require concept-
possession, whereas seeing properties of  the latter kind does.  One can, for instance, see the shape, 2
which happens to be the shape of  a goblet, without recognising that this shape is the shape of  a goblet. 
One can’t, however, see that this shape is the shape of  a goblet without possessing the concept of  a 
goblet. Of  course, any claims about concept-possession are bound to be contentious. But this example 
is merely illustrative, and is by no means required to make the distinction between the two types of  
gestalten which might be at play in some cases of  seeing-as, e.g. the duck-rabbit image. In what follows, 
I treat this as a distinction between seeing organised shape properties and seeing certain artificial kind 
properties — though I assume the ensuing points can also be made on other ways of  capturing this 
distinction. 
 The advantage of  the modest reading of  seeing-as, where the gestalten are (only) organised 
shape properties, is that such effects are widely observed. Whether these effects conform exactly to 
gestalt principles, as they have been described by various gestalt theorists, is open to dispute. However, 
that these effects occur, I take it, isn’t. This means insofar as the perception of  aesthetic properties in-
volves the same kind of  perceptual gestalts as seeing-as, we have good grounds to suppose that we do, 
genuinely, perceive aesthetic properties.  
 The problem with this reading is twofold. First, it threatens the role (6) is supposed to play in 
the argument. Simply put, it is contentious whether organised shape properties can be described as 
high-level properties. This makes (1) — that seeing-as involves the representation of  high-level proper-
ties — contentious. But it also means even if  (6) were true, it won’t, subsequently, help establish that we 
can perceive high-level aesthetic properties — at least not in an uncontroversial manner.  
 To elaborate, organised shape properties are dependent on low-level (non-organised) shape 
properties, and thereby count as high-level properties in one sense. But shape properties are paradigm 
examples of  low-level properties, and so even organised shape properties count as low-level properties 
in another sense.  For the purposes of  this paper, I wish to bypass the thorny issue of  whether organ3 -
 This is orthogonal to the thesis that all perception involves some sort of  conceptual content.2
 Following Brogaard and Chomanaski (2015), my preference is to treat the high-level vs. low-level distinction as 3
a relative notion, where the organised shape properties are at a higher-level than the shape properties on which 
they depend. 
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ised shape properties count as high-level properties. This is because adjudicating the matter will prove 
difficult given that how we ought to understand the high-level vs. low-level distinction will depend on 
your theoretical concerns. What is worth noting is one of  the concerns here is to understand the dis-
tinction in a way that respects the present controversy over whether we perceive high-level properties. I 
doubt those who deny rich perceptual content wish to also deny the occurrence of  gestalt effects con-
cerning perceptual grouping and figure-ground organisation. So the present controversy doesn't seem 
to be one about whether we can perceive high-level properties, where paradigm examples of  such 
properties include organised shape properties. The overall consequence of  the modest reading, then, is 
that (6) being true would, at best, only lend contentious support for the thesis that we can perceive high-
level aesthetic properties. 
 The second problem is more damning, as here we find the modest reading actually also renders 
(6) implausible. How it precisely does so will depend on the aesthetic properties at issue. Stokes 
provides two examples of  aesthetic properties, being serene and being impressionist. These properties aren’t 
on a par. The dominant tradition in aesthetics is to treat aesthetic properties as those properties picked 
out by aesthetic terms, where these terms, following Sibley (1959), are viewed as terms which require 
perceptiveness in order for their application. Sibley’s own list includes lifeless, serene, somber, dynamic, delic-
ate, moving, trite, sentimental, tragic, handsome, and garish. Style properties, e.g. being impressionist and being fauv-
ist, aren’t paradigm aesthetic properties. They have to do with how we categorise artworks, as opposed 
to how we might describe them. Contra Stokes, this makes them artificial kind properties. But note, they 
are a special class of  such properties, for their detection seems to require perceptiveness. For this reas-
on, we may, following Stokes, also classify them as aesthetic properties. The labels don't really matter. 
What does is there being a difference between style properties and paradigmatic aesthetic properties; a 
difference which proves significant when assessing the plausibility of  (6). 
 One of  the aesthetic properties mentioned, i.e. being impressionist, is an artificial kind property. 
This is the kind of  property ruled out from being gestalten on the modest reading of  seeing-as. So on 
this reading, we can’t claim seeing aesthetic properties, qua properties such as being impressionist, involves 
the same kind of  perceptual gestalts as seeing-as. Premise (6), it turns out, is implausible from the get-
go. 
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 A different challenge to (6) presents itself  when we focus on paradigm examples of  aesthetic 
properties, e.g. being serene. Like style properties, paradigm aesthetic properties, insofar as they are high-
level properties, are properties that depend on low-level properties, e.g. shape and colour. The exact 
nature of  this dependence is a matter of  dispute. Nevertheless, the fact that we posit high-level proper-
ties, for ontological or theoretical reasons, is demonstrative that they aren’t properties identical with the 
low-level properties on which they depend. Or, if  they are thus identical, these identities aren’t obvious. 
They require the mastery of  concepts, or something similar. Sibley for instance, in his discussion of  
aesthetic concepts, argues aesthetic judgements require the exercise of  taste. Regardless of  how we fill 
in the details, the point is, insofar as aesthetic properties are high-level properties, any inference from 
perceiving low-level properties, e.g. shape and colour, even organised shape properties, to perceiving 
high-level aesthetic properties, e.g. being serene, isn’t justified; at least, not without further qualification. 
 What is required is some further set of  conditions that would license such inferences. Such 
conditions aren't hard to come by. They might involve acquiring the relevant concepts. Or gaining fa-
miliarity with artworks of  a certain type such that we are able to recognise certain similar patterns in 
them even though they might differ dramatically in shape and colour, e.g. consider the differences be-
tween the works of  Monet and Pissarro despite both being impressionist and often serene. But how we 
fill in the details here will prove crucial to the plausibility of  whether we actually see high-level aesthetic 
properties. The condition of  concept possession, for instance, makes it easy to deny high-level percep-
tion because the sceptic can argue even though we make aesthetic judgements concerning high-level 
properties, such judgements are really post-perceptual judgements we make on the basis of  (only) see-
ing low-level properties. Likewise, if  the condition is one of, say, familiarity, the sceptic could argue the 
patterns one sees are only patterns concerning low-level properties, e.g. certain similarities in organised 
patterns of  shape and colour. The whole point of  comparing aesthetic reaction to visual gestalts was 
that we are supposed to pre-empt such sceptical responses on the basis of  the plausibility of  the latter. 
But if  the relevant inferences from gestalt effects to aesthetic reaction can only be made by stipulating 
further conditions, conditions which make room for well-known sceptical responses, we lose the incen-
tive for making the comparison as means to argue for high-level aesthetic perception. 
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 The immodest reading of  seeing-as bypasses these worries because the gestalten in some cases 
are found to be high-level properties, e.g. artificial kind properties like being a duck representation. The ad-
vantage of  this reading is since the perception of  high-level properties is a feature of  some visual 
gestalts, inferences from such visual gestalts to perceiving high-level aesthetic properties is licensed on 
the basis that both experiences are of  the same kind. For instance, if  we can actually see the property 
being a goblet representation from organised patterns of  shape and colour in the Rubin goblet, insofar as 
aesthetic reaction is literally a form of  perceptual gestalt, we can also, plausibly, perceive properties like 
being serene and being impressionist. 
 The problem with this is whether visual gestalts actually involve the perception of  high-level 
properties is very much open to dispute. In other words, (4) is contentious. Visual gestalts are demon-
strable. However, what isn't is whether these effects involve merely the perception of  organised pat-
terns of  shape and colour, or something above and beyond this. The duck-rabbit gestalt effect, for ex-
ample, is widely reported, but it remains unclear whether this effect is to be interpreted as one where 
we actually see the property being a duck representation over and above the organised shape property being 
organised like a duck. All the reasons for being sceptical of  high-level perception will motivate scepticism 
about such an interpretation. Subsequently, this reading of  seeing-as is as controversial as the central 
controversy over whether we can see high-level properties. 
 Though this paper concerns the use of  gestalt effects to argue for the perception of  high-level 
aesthetic properties, the above point also speaks to possible attempts to employ gestalt effects to argue 
for high-level perception more broadly. The central worry is any interpretation of  gestalt effects, which 
would lend support for the thesis that we perceive high-level properties, would be as controversial as 
the thesis itself. To reiterate, this is because arguments that tell against the thesis also tell against such 
an interpretation. Hence, though gestalt effects are common, it is doubtful that high-level theorists can 
further their cause by appealing to them.  
 In summary, premise (6) states that perceiving some aesthetic properties involves the same kind 
of  perceptual gestalts as seeing-as. This is a premise in Stokes’s argument for the thesis that we some-
times perceive high-level aesthetic properties. In this paper, we saw there are two readings of  seeing-as. 
First, a modest reading which is plausible in and of  itself, but which makes (6) implausible, and thereby 
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doesn’t lend any additional credibility to the aforementioned thesis. Second, a less modest reading, one 
that makes (6) plausible, but which is controversial itself, and thus ultimately won't make the thesis any 
more plausible either. The upshot is we reach a negative verdict: gestalt effects do not make it plausible 
that we perceive high-level aesthetic properties. This is interesting in its own right, but this paper also 
hints at a more general take-home message, namely we should resist the temptation to appeal to gestalt 
effects to argue for high-level perception.  
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